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An Investigation of the Asymmetric link between Credit Re-ratings and 
Corporate Financial Decisions: “Flicking the Switch” with Financial Flexibility 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using a large sample of non-financial US listed firms over the period from 1985-2009, we analyze 
the interactive effect of financial flexibility and credit re-ratings on corporate investment and 
financing decisions. Essentially, we document that financial flexibility (inflexibility) ―flicks the 
switch‖ in the re-rating upgrades (downgrades) scenario. Specifically, a credit rating upgrade 
(downgrade) for financially flexible firms is followed by a reduction (no change) in their cost of 
capital, an increase (no change) in their capital expenditure and an increase (no change) in their net 
debt versus net equity issuance. In contrast, a rating upgrade (downgrade) for financially inflexible 
firms is followed by an insignificant change (an increase) in their cost of capital, an insignificant 
change (decrease) in their capital expenditure and an insignificant change (decrease) in their net 
debt versus net equity issuance. We offer plausible explanations for these asymmetric relations. 
 
          
 
Keywords: financial flexibility, credit re-rating, corporate financial decision making 
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1.  Introduction  
We know from prior studies that credit re-ratings can affect the cost of capital, as well as 
capital budgeting and financing decisions. In this paper, we investigate whether variation in 
financial flexibility impacts these effects.
1
 A major motivation for identifying the dual 
flexibility/ratings focus of our study comes from survey-based evidence documented in 
Graham and Harvey (2001). They report that corporate managers consider financial 
flexibility, or financial ―slack‖, as the most important factor affecting a firm‘s debt 
financing policy, followed by the desire to maintain a good credit rating. To the best of our 
knowledge, no existing research has considered the combined effect of financial flexibility 
and credit ratings on corporate decision making.  
       Kisgen (2006) is the first to analyze the effect of credit ratings on capital structure. 
He finds that firms that are near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less net debt 
versus net equity (INDNE) than firms that are not near a rating change.
2
 This finding 
implies that issuing less net debt versus net equity increases the chance of being upgraded 
for firms that are near an upgrade and decreases the chance of being downgraded for firms 
that are near a downgrade. Extending his first paper, Kisgen (2009) finds that firms reduce 
their net debt versus net equity issuance after a credit rating downgrade, but they do not 
increase their issuance of net debt versus net equity after a credit rating upgrade to avoid a 
reversal of their recent upgrade — suggesting that firms try to maintain minimum credit 
rating levels.  
Although there have been recent advances in our understanding of the influence of 
credit ratings on the financing decision of firms, the influence of credit ratings on 
                                                 
1
 As explained in the research method section, we operationalize ―financial flexibility‖ as a function of the 
reserve borrowing capacity of the firm, broadly captured by the signed deviation from its (modelled) target 
leverage. 
2
 Kisgen defines ―issuance of net debt versus net equity‖ as net debt issuance minus net equity issuance, all 
scaled by total assets at the start of the year.  In his work, ―net debt issuance‖ is defined as: long-term debt 
issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt, and ―net equity issuance‖ is defined as: 
sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock.  
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investment decisions is less well understood. Notably, Gul et al. (2011) in part explore this 
question and find that a credit rating upgrade (downgrade) is followed by an increase 
(decrease) in capital expenditure, in response to the decrease (increase) in the cost of capital 
following these events.  
While Kisgen (2009) focuses on the financing decision and Gul et al. (2011) is 
concerned with the investment decision, in both cases the role of financial flexibility is 
ignored. Our key innovation is to combine the critical insights emanating from both studies 
with regard to the role of credit re-ratings. In particular, we argue that it is important to 
relate their findings to each other given that firms usually issue new net debt to finance their 
growth opportunities. That is, realistically, managers adopt an integrated approach to 
corporate decision-making. Further, we extend the collective thrust of Kisgen (2009) and 
Gul et al. (2011) by incorporating the potentially important influence of financial flexibility. 
As such, we provide an integrated treatment of financial flexibility and credit re-ratings on 
three fronts: (1) the investment decision; (2) the financing decision; and (3) the cost of 
capital (with the last conceptually linking the investment and financing decisions).  
            Our initial analysis shows that a credit rating upgrade (downgrade) is followed by a 
decrease (increase) in the cost of capital and an increase (decrease) in capital expenditure, 
confirming the results found by Gul et al. (2011). Moreover, we find that, on average, firms 
do not increase their net debt versus net equity issuance after an upgrade, but reduce their 
net debt versus net equity issuance after a credit rating downgrade — confirming the 
findings of Kisgen (2009). For ease of reference, Panel A of Figure 1 summarizes the state 
of play in the current literature regarding Kisgen (2009) and Gul et al. (2011). 
           Notably, when we introduce financial flexibility, we find that the response of firms 
to a credit re-rating is asymmetric. A summary of these findings is shown in Panel B of 
Figure 1. When benchmarked relative to financially flexible firms with stable credit ratings, 
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a credit rating upgrade for financially flexible firms is followed by a decrease in their cost 
of capital and an increase in both capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity 
issuance. However, a rating downgrade for financially flexible firms does not induce 
significant changes in their cost of capital, capital expenditure or net debt versus net equity 
issuance.  
           In contrast, when benchmarked against financially inflexible firms with stable credit 
ratings, a rating upgrade for financially inflexible firms is not followed by a significant 
change in their cost of capital, capital expenditure or net debt versus net equity issuance. A 
rating downgrade for these firms is followed by a significant increase in their cost of capital 
and a reduction in both capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance. 
Thus, a careful comparison of Panels  and B of Figure 1 exposes a key new 
insight: the presence/absence of financial flexibility is an asymmetric driver of the 
collective findings documented in Kisgen (2009) and Gul et al. (2011). More specifically, 
our analysis shows that financial flexibility interacts with re-ratings asymmetrically: 
flexibility (inflexibility) ―flicks the switch‖ exclusively for how re-rating upgrades 
(downgrades) impact the cost of capital and financial decisions. When inflexibility 
combines with upgrades (or when flexibility combines with downgrades), the cost of capital 
and financial decisions are unaffected.
3
 
When decomposed into the underlying components of the cost of capital and 
financing, we find that the asymmetry between the two types of firms manifests even 
further.  Panels C and D of Figure 1 summarize these findings relating to the cost of capital 
and financing components for financially flexible and financially inflexible firms, 
respectively.  
                                                 
3
 We also document that our overall results hold for firms that have investment grade ratings. Further, when 
we distinguish re-ratings to the investment-speculative grade boundary versus all other re-ratings, we find that 
all our main findings hold for firms re-rated to the boundary (BBB- or BB+) and non-boundary ratings, except 
that financially flexible firms upgraded to a non-boundary rating do not show a significant change in their net 
debt versus net equity issuance after an upgrade. 
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Regarding the cost of debt, while both flexible and inflexible firms experience a 
reduction (an increase) in their cost of debt after upgrades (downgrades), the response of 
their cost of equity to a credit re-rating is asymmetric. Specifically, financially flexible 
firms experience a reduction in their cost of equity after upgrades, while inflexible firms do 
not. With regard to downgrades, financially flexible firms experience no significant change 
in their cost of equity, while inflexible firms suffer an increase in their equity cost. 
As to how firms respond to changes in their cost of capital components following 
upgrades, we find that financially flexible firms increase their net debt issuance while 
inflexible firms do not. Following downgrades, financially flexible firms make no 
significant changes to their net debt issuance, while inflexible firms choose to retire debt. 
Finally, irrespective of the direction of any credit rating change, neither flexible nor 
inflexible firms make significant changes to their net equity issuance.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the joint effect of financial 
flexibility and credit re-ratings on firms‘ cost of capital, investment and financing decisions. 
Moreover, our finding of a distinct asymmetry across firms in response to credit re-ratings, 
driven by their financial flexibility/inflexibility status, is a new contribution to the literature. 
In addition, our results confirm the importance of financial flexibility (Graham and Harvey, 
2001).  The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop our 
empirical predictions. In Section 3, we describe the empirical framework. In Section 4, we 
present the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Empirical Predictions  
Graham and Harvey (2001) report that corporate managers consider financial flexibility and 
the maintenance of a good credit rating as the two most important determinants of their debt 
financing policy.
4
 Although the literature lacks a universally accepted definition of financial 
flexibility, the reserve borrowing capacity that enables a firm to raise new debt when 
needed to finance growth opportunities is commonly cited (see, for example, Graham, 
2000). A credit rating is a summary measure or index designed to capture a firm‘s credit 
risk, that is, a categorical score that ranks a firm‘s ability to honor its financial obligations 
to creditors in the short and long run.   
           The desire to maintain a good credit rating by firms should not be underestimated. 
Kisgen (2006) reports several pieces of anecdotal evidence of firms striving to avoid being 
downgraded for various reasons. Firms might try to maintain a good credit rating because 
regulations prohibit some institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies and 
pension funds from investing in bonds below investment grade. Moreover, a change in a 
firm‘s credit rating also signals its quality and future prospects to investors, which can 
subsequently affect its cost of capital. Furthermore, a credit re-rating may trigger a re-
negotiation between the firm and its fund suppliers that might affect the subsequent interest 
rates charged by creditors, the coupon rates on bonds, the compulsory repurchase of bonds 
or retirement of debt to creditors and the ability of the firm to access capital or commercial 
paper markets. Alternatively, it might result in a loss of major contracts with customers. 
The occurrence of any of these events, depending on whether they are induced by a rating 
upgrade or downgrade, will see the underlying firm enjoy benefits or bear costs — 
ultimately affecting its cost of capital and investment and financing policies.  
                                                 
4
 Notably, according to their survey results, these two factors are even more highly ranked than the tax 
deductibility advantage of interest on debt. 
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Extending Kisgen (2006), Kisgen (2009) finds that firms issue less net debt versus 
net equity after a credit rating downgrade, but do not increase their net debt versus net 
equity issuance after an upgrade to avoid a reversal of their recent upgrade. This suggests 
that firms try to maintain minimum credit rating levels. However, Kisgen does not 
differentiate between financially flexible and inflexible firms, nor does he analyze the effect 
of credit re-ratings on corporate cost of capital or capital expenditure. Gul et al. (2011) find 
that a credit rating upgrade (downgrade) is followed by an increase (decrease) in capital 
expenditure in response to the decrease (increase) in the cost of capital following these 
events, but again they do not differentiate between financially flexible and inflexible firms 
nor do they incorporate the financing decision into their analysis.  
       Conceptually, a firm decides to undertake a marginal project based on whether the 
investment in the underlying project will increase its value or not, that is, whether the 
project has NPV > 0. Obviously, if a credit re-rating conveys information about the future 
prospects of the firm, fund suppliers such as creditors and stockholders will incorporate this 
information into the return required on their debt and equity funds, thereby affecting the 
firm‘s opportunity cost of capital. Other things being constant, a changed cost of capital 
will produce a different NPV and, thus, affect the firm‘s decision to undertake marginal 
projects. Subsequently, a project that might otherwise be considered economically unviable 
(viable) might be transformed into a NPV > 0 (NPV < 0) case if the cost of capital 
decreases (increases) after a credit rating upgrade (downgrade). The foregoing discussion 
leads to our first empirical prediction: 
 
Prediction 1 (baseline prediction) 
A credit rating upgrade (downgrade) is followed by a decrease (increase) in the firms’ cost 
of capital and an increase (decrease) in their capital expenditure.  
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              However, if corporate management maximizes the wealth of shareholders, 
management will not increase the firm‘s capital expenditure, unless most of the benefits 
from undertaking these new projects flow to the shareholders. Here in lies the importance of 
financial flexibility. Firms with greater financial flexibility are better qualified to take 
advantage of a credit rating upgrade and are less likely to be affected by a downgrade 
compared to firms with low financial flexibility. Financially flexible firms are those that 
have relatively low leverage (for example, relative to the industry norm, stage of their life 
cycle, and so on). Having greater financial flexibility means that these firms are less risky 
and less likely to suffer from the debt overhang problem or to be restricted by tight debt 
covenants. Indeed, a credit rating upgrade will very likely reduce their cost of capital, 
leading to more viable projects at the margin, and subsequently these firms are expected to 
increase their capital expenditure and issuance of net debt versus net equity as most of the 
benefits will be reaped by the shareholders rather than the creditors. Moreover, since these 
financially flexible firms are relatively under-levered, by definition, and less risky, it is less 
likely that their cost of capital will be significantly affected by a downgrade. Therefore, 
these firms have less motivation to reduce their capital expenditure and/or retire some of 
their debt after receiving a downgrade.  
 In contrast, relatively highly levered firms are considered financially inflexible 
because they are more risky and are very likely to be restricted by tight debt covenants 
and/or to suffer from the debt overhang problem. Therefore, a rating upgrade is less likely 
to affect their cost of capital, and if it does, these firms are still unlikely to increase their 
capital expenditure as most of the benefits from undertaking new projects will be reaped by 
the creditors rather than the shareholders. Moreover, since financially inflexible firms are 
already relatively highly levered and more risky, a credit rating downgrade could 
significantly increase their cost of capital, rendering some of their marginal projects 
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economically unviable. Indeed, a credit rating downgrade could trigger an intervention from 
creditors if debt covenants require the firm to retire some debt if its credit rating falls to a 
certain level. As such, these firms are more likely to reduce their capital expenditure and 
retire some of their debt after receiving a downgrade in an attempt to resume their former 
credit rating.  
 Distilling all of the foregoing discussion and arguments regarding the interplay of 
re-ratings with the financial flexibility status of firms, we offer the following set of 
asymmetric empirical predictions under three headings (a) cost of funding; (b) investment; 
and (c) financing: 
 
Cost of Funding Predictions 
P2a. For financially flexible (inflexible) firms, a credit rating upgrade is followed by a 
decrease (negligible change) in their cost of capital.  
 
P2b. For financially flexible (inflexible) firms, a credit rating downgrade is followed by a 
negligible change (an increase) in their cost of capital. 
 
Investment Predictions 
P3a. For financially flexible (inflexible) firms, a credit rating upgrade is followed by an 
increase (negligible change) in their capital expenditure. 
 
P3b. For financially flexible (inflexible) firms, a credit rating downgrade is followed by a 
negligible change (decrease) in their capital expenditure. 
 
Financing Predictions 
P4a. For financially flexible (inflexible) firms, a credit rating upgrade is followed by an 
increase (negligible change) in their net debt versus net equity issuance. 
 
P4b. For financially flexible (inflexible) firms, a credit rating downgrade is followed by a 
negligible change (decrease) in their net debt versus net equity issuance. 
 
 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
3.1.  Data and Sampling 
The cross-sectional dimension of our sample comprises all non-financial firms with a credit 
rating in the S&P 1500 index, while the time series dimension spans the sample period from 
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1985 to 2009. It should be noted that the starting point for our sample is driven by the fact 
that Compustat only began collecting data on corporate credit ratings in 1985.  All firms 
with missing data on the primary variables of interest and negative equity have been 
excluded. Over the sample period, we have 12,705 firm-year observations representing 971 
firms, that is, unbalanced panel data. We employ Standard & Poor’s credit ratings drawn 
from the Compustat database, while financial data are drawn from the CRSP and Compustat 
merged database. Data on annual betas, stock market returns and Treasury bill rates needed 
to calculate the cost of equity are drawn from the CRSP database. Data on yield spreads and 
yield-to-maturity on bond issues needed to calculate the cost of debt are drawn from 
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). The processing of these data is 
described in the following subsections. 
 
3.2. Variable Definitions and Measurement 
3.2.1. The Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variables in our analysis are the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and issuance of net debt versus net equity 
(INDNE). WACC is calculated as the weighted average cost of debt and equity capital 
using standard textbook definitions.
5
 Following Khurana and Raman (2003), among others, 
we proxy the marginal cost of debt for any year by the yield-to-maturity. To capture any 
potential effect of a credit re-rating on the cost of debt, we use the yield-to-maturity on the 
largest existing bond issues made by the issuing firm in the prior year as a proxy for the 
current year. A proxy for the marginal cost of debt for firms that did not make any bond 
issue in a particular year is calculated as the average yield-to-maturity on bond issues made 
                                                 
5
 We use an average corporate tax rate of 40% to calculate the after-tax cost of debt. Also, to rule out the 
variability in the cost of equity that can arise from the variation in the historical market returns, we use the 
long-run average total return on the NYSE Composite index during the past 30 years as a proxy for the 
expected market return.  
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by firms with the same credit rating. Given the survey evidence of Graham and Harvey 
(2001) that the CAPM is the most popular model for estimating the cost of equity, to mimic 
the actual decisions made by managers in practice, we use a CAPM-based cost of equity 
estimate.
6
 The cost of equity for any year is calculated ex-ante using the annual beta at the 
start of the year, the rate on one year Treasury-bills at the start of the year, and the long-run 
average market total return. Capital expenditure (CAPEX) is defined as total capital 
expenditure for any year scaled by net property, plant and equipment at the start of the year. 
As in Kisgen (2006) and Kisgen (2009), issuance of net debt versus net equity is defined as 
net debt issuance (long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in 
current debt) minus net equity issuance (sale of common and preferred stock minus 
purchase of common and preferred stock), all scaled by total assets at the start of the year.  
 
3.2.2. The Explanatory Variables: Financial Flexibility and Credit Re-rating 
Our two core ―test‖ variables are credit ratings, particularly changes therein, and financial 
flexibility. Following Horrigan (1966) and Kisgen (2006), credit ratings are transformed 
into numerical scores ranging from 1 for the lowest credit ratings (C and D) to 21 for the 
highest credit rating (AAA). When a credit rating change occurs, the change is simply 
captured as the difference between the numerical credit rating score after the change and the 
numerical credit rating score before the change. That is, a positive (negative) change 
reflects a rating upgrade (downgrade) for the company in question.   
           Regarding financial flexibility, we need to differentiate between those firms that are 
financially flexible and those that are financially inflexible. Although the literature lacks a 
                                                 
6
 Gul et al. (2011) calculate the cost of equity using the Easton (2004) PEG model as the square root of the 
difference between the expected earnings per share (EPS) over two consecutive years, scaled by the 
beginning of year stock price. However, this method requires the difference in the expected EPS to be 
positive, which would result in a sizable reduction in our sample (25%) and a bias in favor of firms with 
stable earnings. Hence, to overcome these problems, we use the CAPM-based method. Notably, this 
difference is not critical as our findings on the cost of capital/credit re-rating linkage are qualitatively similar 
to theirs. 
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universally accepted definition/measure, financial flexibility typically refers to the firm‘s 
reserve borrowing capacity (e.g., Graham, 2000). To this end, we follow the firm-specific 
method employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) to delineate financially flexible firms from 
inflexible firms. This proxy measures the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from 
its long-run target. The variables they use in their model are drawn from the work of Frank 
and Goyal (2009), who find that median industry leverage, market-to-book ratio (Tobin‘s 
Q), asset tangibility (NPPE/Assets), operating profit (EBIT/Assets), size (the log of total 
assets) and expected inflation are the most reliable factors affecting leverage decisions of US 
publicly traded firms. Accordingly, we estimate the following annual double-censored Tobit 
regression: 
 
                                                                        
                                                                           
 
To achieve an economically meaningful differentiation between financially flexible and 
inflexible firms, we apply a ± 3% filter. Specifically, firms that have a market leverage ratio 
that is at least 3% below (above) their target are considered financially flexible (inflexible), 
while firms with a market leverage ratio that falls within ± 3% of their target are considered 
financially ―neutral‖.7  
 Combining the two concepts of credit rating change and financial flexibility, we 
require a set of compound variables that capture the interaction between credit re-rating and 
financial flexibility status. Accordingly, we create the following seven interaction dummy 
variables:  
DFS: represents financially flexible firms which experience no change in their credit 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
flexible with a stable credit rating, and zero otherwise. 
  
                                                 
7
 We thank an anonymous referee for proposing this cut-off approach to delineate firms based on their relative 
financial flexibility.  
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DFU: represents financially flexible firms which experience a rating upgrade. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially flexible and 
experiences a credit rating upgrade, and zero otherwise.  
   
DFD: represents financially flexible firms which experience a rating downgrade. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially flexible and 
experiences a credit rating downgrade, and zero otherwise.    
 
DIS: represents financially inflexible firms which experience no change in their credit 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
inflexible with a stable credit rating, and zero otherwise. 
  
DIU: represents financially inflexible firms which experience a rating upgrade. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially inflexible and 
experiences a credit rating upgrade, and zero otherwise.  
   
DID: represents financially inflexible firms which experience a rating downgrade. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially inflexible and 
experiences a credit rating downgrade, and zero otherwise.  
 
DNA: represents all financially neutral firms (whether stable, upgraded or 
downgraded). The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is 
financially neutral, and zero otherwise.  
 
Additionally, for robustness purposes, we re-estimate Equation (1) and create an alternative 
set of interaction variables using book leverage to delineate financially flexible firms, 
financially inflexible firms and financially neutral firms.  
 
3.2.3. The Control Variables 
To control for firm profitability and internally generated funds, we use EBITDA.  EBITDA 
is calculated as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, scaled by total 
assets. Moreover, following Gray et al. (2006) who document the importance of a change in 
profitability in signaling the prospects of the firm, we also include the change in EBITDA 
as a control variable. Tobin‘s Q controls for growth opportunities and is calculated as total 
liabilities plus market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets. To control for 
firm size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets, Ln(Assets). NPPE controls for asset 
tangibility and is defined as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment, divided by total 
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assets. We also use research and development expense, R&D, as a control variable 
calculated as research and development expense divided by total assets.
8
  
Further, given that Graham and Harvey (2001) report that the concern about 
financial flexibility is more profound for dividend paying firms, a dividend variable is 
included as a control. Specifically, dividend is defined as the ratio of cash dividends to total 
assets. Moreover, since firms might accumulate some cash reserves to finance their growth 
opportunities, the variable ‗Cash‖ is included as a control. Cash is defined as the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Finally, we also use firm credit rating levels to 
control for firm credit risk.  
3.3.  Background and Basic Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on the main variables for our subsamples 
of financially flexible, inflexible and neutral firms, delineated based on the market leverage 
proxy for financial flexibility.
9
 All ratio variables have been winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentile. Several interesting comparisons are noted from this table. First, we see that 
flexible firms have a higher sample mean cost of capital compared with their inflexible firm 
counterparts: 11.8% versus 9.2% due to the (on average) higher weighting of equity in the 
capital structure of financially flexible firms. This difference in WACC is also suggestive of 
a higher likelihood that flexible firms invest in higher risk projects, on average. Second, 
while mean CAPEX is very similar between the two groups (22%), INDNE is much higher 
for inflexible firms: 9.8% versus 0.7%. Third, as expected, firms classified as financially 
                                                 
8
 A dummy variable is also created to capture missing R&D observations. 
9
 The aggregate sample descriptive statistics are suppressed for brevity reasons. A few interesting observations 
can be made regarding our key variables of interest. First, the sample mean (median) WACC is around 10-
11% per annum – a value that is plausible and comparable to existing similar studies – e.g., Fama and French 
(1999), whose estimated nominal cost of capital is 10.72% for the period 1950-1996. Second, the sample 
mean (median) cost of debt at 7.5% (7%) is comfortably lower than the counterpart for the cost of equity at 
13.1% (12.7%). Third, on average, sample firms have invested around 22% in new capital expenditure, which 
closely accords with figures reported in Gul et al (2011) (21.4%). Fourth, the sample mean (median) issuance 
of net debt versus net equity is 4.5% (1.4%) indicating a considerable right skew to this distribution. 
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inflexible have a higher sample mean leverage (35.3%) compared to their flexible firm 
counterparts (13.7%.)
10
 Finally, the WACC and INDNE of financially neutral firms fall in 
between those of financially flexible and inflexible firms, while the CAPEX of these 
financially neutral firms is not substantially different from the others. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the distribution of corporate bond credit ratings across our sub-
samples of financially flexible, inflexible and neutral firms, delineated based on the market 
leverage proxy for financial flexibility. The credit rating data used in the analysis are from 
Standard & Poor‘s Long-term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating (data item 280), defined by 
Standard & Poor‘s (2001) as the ―current opinion on an issuer‘s overall capacity to pay its 
financial obligations‖. As shown in the table, there are a total of 2,775 credit re-ratings 
during the sample period, of which 1,236 are upgrades and 1,539 are downgrades.  
From the table, several interesting observations can be made. First, we see that there 
is a healthy spread of cases across all the investment grade ratings, with only the very 
lowest ratings below B- showing few observations. Second, in terms of upgrade transitions, 
the majority of movement occurs between the grades of A and BB-, with the highest 
incidence of upgrades to BB (N = 154). Third, in terms of downgrade transitions, the 
greatest concentration occurs between A- and BB-, with a maximum of sample cases 
downgrading to BBB (N = 203). As expected, we see a higher incidence of flexible firms 
with higher credit ratings than inflexible firms. For example, of the 253 firm-year 
observations falling in the AAA category, 125 (28) are assigned to flexible (inflexible) 
firms, whereas of the 725 firm-year observations falling in the B+ category, 216 (378) are 
assigned to flexible (inflexible) firms. A compatible pattern is noted regarding credit re-
                                                 
10
 Nevertheless, given the method that we use to delineate flexibility/inflexibility, it is still quite possible for 
firms within our sample to have low (high) financial leverage per se, but be deemed financially inflexible 
(flexible). The reader should be wary of this important distinction throughout all the ensuing analysis and 
discussion. 
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ratings — generally, there is a higher incidence of upgrades for flexible firms compared to 
their inflexible firm counterparts. Nevertheless, we see a meaningful spread of ratings/re-
ratings across both of these segments of our sample. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1.  Baseline Model Estimation — Ignoring Financial Flexibility 
We begin our analysis by combining and replicating the work of Kisgen (2009) and Gul et 
al. (2011), to establish baseline relations between the cost of capital and financial decisions 
versus credit re-ratings. Given that we have a system of equations, we estimate the three 
functions jointly using full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which uses all 
information embedded in each equation. As such, this analysis serves the dual purpose of 
relating their findings to each other and providing a baseline set of results, against which 
the main part of our study can be benchmarked and developed. To this end, we create two 
dummy variables for credit re-ratings as follows: 
 
DUP: represents an upgrade credit rating event. The variable takes a value of unity if a 
firm’s credit rating was upgraded in a particular year, and zero otherwise.  
 
DDOWN: represents a downgrade credit rating event. The variable takes a value of 
unity if a firm’s credit rating was downgraded in a particular year, and zero otherwise.  
 
 Table 3 reports the results from regressing the change in the cost of capital, capital 
expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance functions on credit rating upgrades and 
downgrades, in addition to the control variables. As shown in the table, a credit rating 
upgrade is followed by a significant decrease in the cost of capital and a significant increase 
in capital expenditures, supporting the findings of Gul et al (2011).  Further, the upgrade is 
not followed by a significant change in net debt versus net equity issuance, supporting the 
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finding of Kisgen (2009). The increase in capital expenditures seems to be driven by the 
decrease in the cost of capital, which makes some marginal projects that would have been 
otherwise rejected, now acceptable after the upgrade.  
            The second key result in Table 3 shows that a credit rating downgrade is followed 
by an increase in the cost of capital and a decrease in capital expenditure, supporting the 
findings of Gul et al. (2011), and a decrease in net debt versus net equity issuance, which 
supports the findings of Kisgen (2009).  Thus, Table 3 provides a baseline set of results that 
collectively confirm the prior work of Gul et al. (2011) and Kisgen (2009) regarding the 
linkage between corporate financial decision making and credit re-ratings. Moreover, this 
analysis supports baseline Prediction 1, as outlined earlier. 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
While the change in capital expenditure after an upgrade or a downgrade seems to 
be driven by the change in the cost of capital following these events, it is less clear whether 
the change in net debt versus net equity issuance is also related to the change in the cost of 
capital following a credit re-rating. To examine whether the change in capital expenditure 
and net debt versus net equity issuance are both driven by the effect of credit re-ratings on 
the cost of capital, we use two-stage least squares, following Gul et al. (2011), modified to 
include additional interaction terms to capture the nonlinear effect of credit re-ratings across 
the ratings spectrum.
11, 12
 In the first stage, the costs of debt and equity functions are 
estimated as follows: 
                                                                                               
 
                                                                                                
                                                 
11
 We thank an anonymous referee for alerting us to the need to model these nonlinear effects. Our findings 
are robust to the removal of the nonlinear terms. Details are available from the authors upon request.  
12
 As an alternative robustness check, these equations are re-estimated using spline regressions to capture the 
nonlinear effect and the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. Details are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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The results from regressions (2) and (3) are as follows:
13
 
 
                                                                                          
   (t-stat)   (29.40)     (4.42)                               (40.41)                           (4.48) 
                                                                                          
    (t-stat)   (11.80)     (3.94)                             (30.25)                         (3.28) 
           As shown above, the costs of both debt and equity are negative functions of the 
changes in credit rating and the rating level. Further, the positive estimated coefficient on 
the interaction term between the changes in credit rating and the credit rating levels 
suggests that both the costs of debt and equity are less negatively related to the change in 
credit rating (rating level) for highly rated (strongly upgraded) firms. This supports the 
notion of nonlinearity.  
           In the second stage, we regress capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity 
issuance on the estimated cost of capital (derived from the first stage estimates of the 
component costs), in addition to the control variables. Table 4 reports the results from these 
regressions. As shown in the table, both capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity 
issuance decrease significantly in the estimated cost of capital, implying that the change in 
both capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance are driven by the effect of a 
credit re-rating on the cost of capital.  
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2. The Effect of Financial Flexibility and Credit Re-rating on the Cost of Capital and 
Corporate Financial Decisions 
 
In this subsection, using separate OLS regressions, we re-estimate our models and include 
the set of interaction dummy variables defined in Section 3.2.2. to assess whether 
                                                 
13
 Since the composition of rating changes vary widely by year, e.g., see Table 3 of Benmelech and Dlugosz 
(2009), both equations (2) and (3) are estimated with year dummies. These dummies are not reported to 
conserve space.  
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introducing financial flexibility into the analysis offers new insights (following our 
empirical Predictions 2, 3 and 4). We begin with the cost of capital and its components. 
Table 5 reports the results from modeling the change in the cost of debt, the change in the 
cost of equity and the change in the cost of capital as functions of the interaction between 
credit re-rating and financial flexibility, in addition to a set of control variables. For 
robustness and comparison purposes, we report the results using both market and book 
leverage-based proxies for financial flexibility. The table contains several notable 
findings.
14
  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Benchmarked relative to stable rating financially flexible firms (this group of firms 
is the omitted case captured by the constant term), an upgrade to financially flexible firms 
(i.e., DFU) is followed by a decrease in their (a) cost of debt; (b) cost of equity; and (c) 
overall cost of capital using either market or book leverage-based proxies for financial 
flexibility. In contrast, when benchmarked against stable rating financially inflexible firms 
(this group of firms is the omitted case captured by the constant term), an upgrade to 
financially inflexible firms (i.e., DIU) is followed by a decrease (no change) in their cost of 
debt (equity), leading to an insignificant change in their overall cost of capital. It appears 
that the contribution of the decrease in the cost of debt on the cost of capital of these firms, 
after an upgrade, is dominated by the insignificant effect of the upgrade on their cost of 
equity.
15
 Generally, these findings support prediction P2a.  
                                                 
14
  To make the analysis easier to interpret, we report the results for upgraded and downgraded financially 
flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant benchmark i.e. stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) 
firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent versions of the system in each case – one version omits 
the DFS dummy and this is used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second version omits the DIS dummy 
and this is used to benchmark DIU/DID. For each base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction 
dummies, but we report the result for each group to conserve space. 
15
 Similar to the above, the lack of response by the equity holders of these firms to an upgrade is influenced by 
a range of factors. For example, we see: (i) a relatively lower incidence of upgrades compared to downgrades 
for these firms (241 cases vs. 708 cases; refer to Table 2); and (ii) a relatively lower rating level of these 
upgrades compared to that witnessed for counterpart flexible firms (concentrated in the range BBB to B+ for 
the former group vs. A+ to B+ for the latter group; refer to Table 2). The combined effect of these factors tend 
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The analysis reported in Table 5 also shows that a downgrade to financially flexible 
firms (i.e., DFD) is followed by (a) an increase in their cost of debt; and (b) an insignificant 
change in their cost of equity and overall cost of capital.
16
 The low debt weighting and the 
insignificant change in the cost of equity following a downgrade jointly explains the 
insignificant effect on the overall cost of capital of these firms.
17
 In contrast, a downgrade 
to financially inflexible firms (i.e., DID) is followed by a significant increase in both the 
costs of debt and equity, leading to an increase in their overall cost of capital. This uniform 
directional impact on the component costs of capital is most likely attributable to the higher 
risk borne by both the creditors and the shareholders of these downgraded firms. Generally, 
these findings support prediction P2b. 
Table 6 reports the results of modeling the investment and financing decisions on 
the interaction variables, in addition to a set of control variables. Benchmarked relative to 
stable rating financially flexible firms (this group of firms is the omitted case captured by 
the constant term), an upgrade to financially flexible firms (i.e., DFU) is followed by an 
increase in their capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance.
18
 In contrast, 
when benchmarked against stable rating financially inflexible firms (this group of firms is 
the omitted case captured by the constant term), an upgrade to financially inflexible firms 
                                                                                                                                                     
to make shareholders less sensitive, on average, to the potentially positive effects of the rating upgrade 
experienced by these inflexible firms. 
16
 The asymmetric response of equity returns to downgrades/upgrades and across various scenarios has been 
well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Goh and Ederington, 1993). Investigating the various possible 
reasons for this asymmetric response is beyond the scope of our work. 
17
 The lack of response by the equity holders of these firms to a downgrade is influenced by a range of factors, 
including the combined effect of: (i) the relatively lower incidence of downgrades compared to upgrades for 
these firms (445 cases vs. 694 cases; refer to Table 2); (ii) the relatively higher rating level of these 
downgrades compared to that witnessed for counterpart inflexible firms (concentrated in the range A- to BBB- 
for the former group vs. BBB to B- for the latter group; refer to Table 2); and (iii) the low weighting of debt in 
the capital structure of these firms that make the shareholders less concerned about losing their stake in the 
event of bankruptcy. 
18
 It is worth noting that issuance of net debt versus net equity for upgraded financially flexible firms (DFU) 
becomes much more significant when benchmarked against stable financially inflexible firms and financially 
neutral firms. 
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(i.e., DIU) does not seem to trigger a significant change in either their capital expenditures 
or net debt versus net equity issuance. Hence, predictions P3a and P4a are supported.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The analysis reported in Table 6 also shows that a downgrade for financially 
flexible firms (i.e., DFD) is not followed by a significant change in either their capital 
expenditure or their net debt versus net equity issuance. However, a downgrade to 
financially inflexible firms (i.e., DID) is followed by a significant reduction in both their 
capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance. Hence, broadly speaking, we 
also find strong support for predictions P3b and P4b in our sample. 
The asymmetry identified in our full package of findings in terms of cost of capital 
and financial decisions, which cuts across both the re-rating dimension and the financial 
flexibility dimension, has strong intuitive appeal. If we consider financial flexibility as an 
indication of underlying firm ―quality‖, while re-rating events represent news about the 
firm‘s financial health, it is not surprising that our strong results occur when these two 
dimensions are reinforcing one another — namely, when flexibility (i.e., higher quality) 
combines with rating upgrades (i.e., good news) or when inflexibility (i.e., lower quality) 
combines with rating downgrades (i.e., bad news). Alternatively, when these two 
dimensions are in conflict, their opposing forces tend to cancel each other out. That is, our 
insignificant results occur (a) when a firm manages to retain its flexibility (i.e., higher 
quality) status despite suffering a rating downgrade (i.e., bad news); or (b) when a firm fails 
to clear its inflexibility (i.e., lower quality) status despite achieving a rating upgrade (i.e., 
good news).  
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4.3. The Joint Effect of Financial Flexibility and Credit Re-rating on the Cost of Capital 
and Corporate Financial Decisions 
Given that we have three key focus variables, our model constitutes a trivariate system of 
equations comprising: a cost of capital equation; an investment decision equation (i.e., 
modeling CAPEX); and a financing decision equation (i.e., modeling INDNE). Based on 
individual OLS regressions, the preceding analysis ignores the interrelated nature of this 
system, which might induce unreliable inferences. Accordingly, Table 7 reports the results 
of re-estimating the three functions jointly using FIML estimation.
19
 
The results reported in Table 7 continue to confirm the asymmetric findings 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. This asymmetric response to credit re-ratings highlights the 
critical importance of financial flexibility not only to firms‘ financing decisions, but also to 
their capital expenditure decisions. As such, this confirms the survey evidence documented 
by Graham and Harvey (2001), and also gives support to the debt overhang problem 
proposed by Myers (1977). Most notably, our results suggest that the core findings of Gul et 
al. (2011) — namely that capital expenditure increases (decreases) after an upgrade 
(downgrade) are primarily driven by financially flexible (inflexible) firms. Similarly, the 
core finding of Kisgen (2009) — that firms reduce their debt after a downgrade but do not 
issue new debt after an upgrade — seems to be largely driven by financially inflexible 
firms, as we document that financially flexible firms do issue new debt after an upgrade and 
do not reduce their debt after a downgrade.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Next, we decompose the cost of capital into its nominal (unweighted) components 
and associated financing forms to analyze how each form of financing responds to changes 
in its cost after a credit re-rating. Table 8 reports the results from regressing the change in 
                                                 
19
 Given that both market and book leverage-based proxies produce very similar results in the earlier analysis, 
to conserve space we retain only the market leverage-based proxy from this point on. 
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the nominal cost of debt versus net debt issuance and the change in the nominal cost of 
equity versus net equity issuance. As net equity issuance is found to be insensitive to any of 
our four scenarios, no further comment on it follows. 
When benchmarked against stable rating financially flexible firms, an upgrade to the 
credit rating of financially flexible firms is followed by a reduction in their cost of debt 
associated with an increase in their net debt issuance. The upgrade to these firms is also 
followed by a reduction in their cost of equity capital. In contrast, while an upgrade to 
financially inflexible firms is also followed by a decrease in the cost of debt, here it is 
associated with an insignificant change in net debt issuance, possibly motivated by a desire 
to avoid a reversal of their recent upgrade (as per the argument of Kisgen, 2009). The 
upgraded ratings of these firms are also followed by insignificant changes in their cost of 
equity. 
Further, while a downgrade to the rating of financially flexible firms is followed by 
an increase in their cost of debt, such downgrade does not seem to have an effect on the net 
debt issuance or cost of equity of these firms. In contrast, a downgrade to the credit ratings 
of financially inflexible firms, while also followed by an increase in their cost of debt, is 
associated with a reduction in their net debt issuance and an increase in their cost of equity.  
The foregoing discussion reiterates our primary message: that financial flexibility 
matters and that flexibility is an important determinant of corporate decision making. 
Beyond this, our analysis produces additional insights. For example, we see that financially 
inflexible firms reduce their debt after a downgrade but do not change their equity issuance, 
and that a downgrade to the credit rating of these firms is followed by an increase in their 
cost of capital and a reduction in their capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity 
issuance. Collectively, these results imply that these firms, rather than risk sending a signal 
that could be interpreted negatively by the market if they increase their equity issuance after 
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a downgrade (seeking to improve their credit standing), prefer to reduce their capital 
expenditure. This outcome might be achieved by sacrificing those projects that become 
unprofitable after the downgrade, thereby allowing them to retire some of their debt with 
the goal of resuming their former credit rating. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
 
4.4.      Investment/Speculative Grade and Boundary Effects20 
In this subsection, we investigate whether our core results are being driven by firms with 
very low ratings or firms with re-ratings across the investment/speculative grade boundary. 
To address the first concern, we re-estimate our main models for the subset of our sample 
involving investment grade firms i.e., firms with credit ratings ≥ (BBB-). Table 9 reports 
these results and show that the main findings documented in Table 7 are reaffirmed for this 
subsample. Hence, our main findings do not appear to be driven by firms rated in the 
speculative grades.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
            Further, some researchers find that the boundary between investment and 
speculative grade ratings (i.e., BBB- and BB+ ratings) has a profound influence on 
corporate financial decisions (e.g., see Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012). For various 
reasons, firms upgraded or downgraded to this boundary experience a substantial shift in 
their economic conditions, which is likely to materially affect their investment and 
financing decisions. Accordingly, we design a variation of our experiment that aims to 
capture the potential importance of this ―investment/speculative grade boundary effect‖.  
One challenging empirical problem in dealing with firms rated at the boundary is the 
noise inherent in the ratings defining this boundary. According to Chernenko and Sunderam 
                                                 
20
 We thank an anonymous referee for motivating us to consider the potential impact/importance of the 
boundary between investment and speculative grade firms on our analysis.  
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(2012), for example, some firms rated BBB- should be rated BB+ and vice versa. 
Therefore, to minimize this potential source of noise and also to have sufficient 
observations on re-ratings to the boundary that yield reliable inferences, we treat both 
ratings jointly as the ―boundary‖ cases. In the context of our earlier key analyses, to see 
whether the boundary plays a role in influencing corporate cost of capital and financial 
decisions, we develop 11 interaction variables as follows: 
DFS: represents financially flexible firms which experience no change in their credit 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
flexible and experiences no change in its credit rating, and zero otherwise. 
 
DFNBU: represents financially flexible firms that are upgraded to a non-boundary 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
flexible and experiences a credit rating upgrade to a non-boundary rating (i.e., to 
neither BBB- nor BB+ ratings), and zero otherwise. 
 
DFNBD: represents financially flexible firms that are downgraded to a non-boundary 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
flexible and experiences a credit rating downgrade to a non-boundary rating (i.e., to 
neither BBB- nor BB+ ratings), and zero otherwise. 
   
DFBU: represents financially flexible firms that are upgraded to the boundary. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially flexible and 
experiences a credit rating upgrade to the boundary (i.e., to either BBB- or BB+), and 
zero otherwise.  
    
DFBD: represents financially flexible firms that are downgraded to the boundary. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially flexible and 
experiences a credit rating downgrade to the boundary (i.e., to either BBB- or BB+), 
and zero otherwise.    
   
DIS: represents financially inflexible firms which experience no change in their credit 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
inflexible and experiences no change in its credit rating, and zero otherwise. 
 
DINBU: represents financially inflexible firms that are upgraded to a non-boundary 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
inflexible and experiences a credit rating upgrade to a non-boundary rating (i.e., to 
neither BBB- nor BB+ ratings), and zero otherwise. 
 
DINBD: represents financially inflexible firms that are downgraded to a non-boundary 
rating. The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially 
inflexible and experiences a credit rating downgrade to a non-boundary rating (i.e. to 
neither BBB- nor BB+ ratings), and zero otherwise. 
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DIBU: represents financially inflexible firms that are upgraded to the boundary. The 
variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially inflexible and 
experiences a credit rating upgrade to the boundary (i.e., to either BBB- or BB+), and 
zero otherwise.  
    
DIBD: represents financially inflexible firms that are downgraded to the boundary. 
The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is financially inflexible 
and experiences a credit rating downgrade to the boundary (i.e., to either BBB- or 
BB+), and zero otherwise.    
 
DNA: represents all financially neutral firms (whether stable, upgraded or 
downgraded). The variable takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the firm is 
financially neutral, and zero otherwise.  
 
            
 Table 10 reports the results obtained from jointly regressing the cost of capital, 
capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance on the interaction variables 
defined above and the control variables. As shown in the table, our main results reported in 
Table 7 hold whether financially flexible or inflexible firms are upgraded to a boundary or 
to a non-boundary rating — with the exception of one notable difference regarding issuance 
of net debt versus net equity by financially flexible firms after an upgrade. Specifically, 
according to the results reported in Table 10, financially flexible firms upgraded to a non-
boundary rating (DFNBU) do not increase their net debt versus net equity issuance after an 
upgrade, whereas financially flexible firms upgraded to the boundary (DFBU) do increase 
their net debt versus net equity issuance following an upgrade. This latter finding implies a 
material change in the economic conditions of these ―boundary-upgraded‖ firms that 
encourage them to raise new debt to finance their growth opportunities. Thus, it appears 
that the finding in Table 7, that financially flexible firms increase their issuance of net debt 
versus net equity after an upgrade, is mainly driven by those financially flexible firms 
upgraded to the boundary.  
 The other interesting feature of the analysis portrayed in Table 10 relates to the 
robust asymmetric effect of rating downgrades. On the one hand, a downgrade has an 
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insignificant effect on the cost of capital and financial decisions of financially flexible 
firms, irrespective of whether they are downgraded to the boundary or to a non-boundary 
rating. In contrast, a downgrade to financially inflexible firms does have a significant effect 
on the cost of capital and financial decisions of these firms in both scenarios. Collectively, 
these findings again highlight the importance of financial flexibility in influencing 
corporate financial decisions.   
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
4.5. Endogeneity  
Although credit rating agencies have private access to firms‘ future plans and take them 
into consideration when assigning their credit rating, we argue that the main empirical 
results reported in Table 7 are unlikely to be driven by this private access. Since we find 
that financially flexible (inflexible) firms increase (reduce) their debt after an upgrade 
(downgrade), it is less likely that the rating agency will upgrade (downgrade) a firm that 
intends to increase (reduce) its debt in the following year. Generally, responses of firms to 
credit re-ratings seem to be driven by the change in their cost of capital after a change in 
their credit rating (as reported in Table 4). 
          Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our findings and address the possibility of 
endogeneity using two stage least squares, as in Kisgen (2006). Kisgen regresses the 
numerical credit rating scores on variables that are considered highly influential in 
determining firms‘ credit ratings. Following the principle of parsimony, Kisgen finds three 
instrumental variables that are most critical in determining credit rating scores: namely, the 
natural logarithm of total assets, Ln(Assets) the ratio of Earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization to total assets, (EBITDA/A), and debt to total capitalization 
(Debt/Total.Cap). In the second stage, he uses the predicted credit rating scores from the 
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first stage regression to rank firms into terciles under each predicted score for the purpose 
of analyzing the effect of the firm‘s rank on its issuance of net debt versus net equity.  
We follow his approach and use the same instrumental variables to predict credit 
rating scores for each firm-year. The results from our regression are shown in Equation (4), 
which is similar to the counterpart estimated by Kisgen (2006): 
                                        
      
 
         
    
         
                      
   (t-stat )                    (25.32)                            (12.83)                            (14.19) 
The predicted credit rating scores are rounded to whole numbers (positive integers). 
Further, since firm leverage may increase or decrease for reasons other than the desire to 
maintain financial flexibility, the deviation of the firm‘s actual market leverage from the 
predicted firm‘s market leverage estimated in Equation (1), Section 3.2.2. is used in 
conjunction with the predicted credit rating scores estimated above. This creates a new set 
of interaction variables similar to those created in Section 3.2.2.   
       Table 11 reports the results obtained from regressing the change in the cost of 
capital, capital expenditure and net debt versus net equity issuance on the estimated 
interaction variables. As shown in the table, the inferences emanating from Table 11 are 
identical to the main results drawn from Table 7.  
 [Insert Table 11 here] 
4.6. Further Robustness Tests 
Finally, we check the robustness of our results to several other accepted measures used in 
the literature. In our main analysis, we proxy the marginal cost of debt for any year by the 
yield-to-maturity on the largest existing bond issues made by the issuing firm in the prior 
year, which then feeds into our overall WACC measure. Alternatively, Shaw (2012) and 
Brockman et al. (2010) use the yield spread as a proxy for the cost of debt, calculated as the 
difference between the yield-to-maturity on corporate bonds and the yield-to-maturity on 
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Treasury bonds of comparable maturity. To this end, we test the robustness of our main 
results with regard to the effect of a credit re-rating on the cost of debt, proxied as either the 
yield spread on the most recent bond issue made in the prior year or the yield spread on the 
largest bond issue made in the prior year. These proxies produce qualitatively similar 
findings, as shown in Table 12. Specifically, Panel A of the table provides the robustness 
checks relating to the cost of debt modeling (core results shown in Table 5), while Panel B 
provides the robustness checks relating to the joint estimation of the WACC, CAPEX and 
INDNE equations (core results shown in Table 7).
21
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
In a final set of robustness analysis, we re-estimate our findings using financial 
flexibility proxies based on the overall sample median market leverage ratio and industry 
median market leverage ratio. Specifically, in the former case, firms with a financial 
leverage ratio that is at least 3% below (above) the full sample median ratio of 20% are 
deemed financially flexible (inflexible). In the latter case, relative to a four-digit definition 
of industry, firms with a financial leverage ratio that is at least 3% below (above) the 
industry sample median leverage ratio are deemed financially flexible (inflexible).
22
 We 
also apply an alternative estimation method for robustness purposes: namely, seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR). The SUR method estimates the three equations jointly, 
allowing them to be related through their error terms. Our findings, inferences and 
conclusions remain solidly robust with each of these variations.
23
 
                                                 
21
 Since the alternative cost of debt proxies are net of the risk-free rate, we apply this consistently to the cost 
of capital equation in the robustness checks. While netting the risk-free rate does not affect the sign or 
magnitude of the coefficients of interest in any way, the estimated intercepts in both panels are lower 
(compared to their Table 5 and 7 counterparts) by an amount equal to the sample average implied estimate of 
the risk-free rate. Based on a comparison of the coefficient estimates in this table, the implied estimate of the 
risk-free rate is plausible and lies in the range of 2.1% to 2.4% per annum. 
22
 If in any year there are less than 10 observations in a given four-digit pool, we use the median for the 
associated three or two-digit code. 
23
 Since all estimations produce very similar outcomes to the results reported in this paper, we do not tabulate 
these alternative analyses. Full estimation details are available from the authors upon request.  
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5. Conclusion 
Using a large sample of non-financial US listed firms over the period 1985-2009, this paper 
analyzes the joint effect of financial flexibility and credit re-ratings on corporate cost of 
capital, capital expenditure and financing decisions. Our main findings can be summarized 
as follows. When benchmarked against stable rating financially flexible firms, a credit 
rating upgrade to financially flexible firms is followed by a reduction in their cost of capital 
and an increase in their capital expenditure and issuance of net debt versus net equity, while 
a downgrade is not followed by any significant changes. In contrast, an upgrade to 
financially inflexible firms is not followed by significant changes, while a downgrade is 
followed by an increase in the cost of capital and a reduction in the capital expenditure and 
net debt versus net equity issuance of these firms.
24
  
Thus, the key finding from our study is that corporate financial flexibility matters. 
Moreover, we show that flexibility matters in a very particular way when it is examined 
conjointly with the critical corporate event of credit re-ratings. In terms of recent key 
literature, we find that financial flexibility is an asymmetric driver of the collective findings 
reported in Kisgen (2009) and Gul et al. (2011). More specifically, we document that 
flexibility interacts with credit re-ratings asymmetrically, that is, flexibility (inflexibility) 
―flicks the switch‖ exclusively in the re-rating upgrades (downgrades) scenario. In contrast, 
when inflexibility (flexibility) combines with re-rating upgrades (downgrades), financial 
decision making is unaffected. Given the research design of both Kisgen (2009) and Gul et 
al. (2011), such subtleties are undetectable in their analyses. As such, the findings from our 
study contribute new and significant insights to the current literature.  
                                                 
24
 Notably, these results hold for firms having investment grade ratings, as well as firms re-rated to the 
boundary between investment and speculative ratings. The one additional new insight in the latter case is that 
financially flexible firms upgraded to the investment/speculative rating boundary drive the increase in net debt 
versus net equity issuance observed for these firms. 
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Panel A: Findings in Gul et al. (2011) and Kisgen (2009) independently confirmed in the current paper 
                          Rating Upgrade    Rating Downgrade 
Gul et al. (2011) ↓ 
CAPEX ↑ 
↑ 
CAPEX↓ 
Kisgen (2009) □ INDNE INDNE↓ 
Panel B: Current Paper New Results – Conditional on Financial Flexibility* 
 Rating Upgrade             Rating Downgrade 
 FLEX INFLEX FLEX INFLEX 
WACC (K) ↓ □ □  ↑ 
CAPEX ↑ □  □  ↓ 
INDNE ↑ □ □ ↓ 
Panel C: Current Paper New Results – Components of Cost of Capital Conditional on Financial Flexibility 
 Rating Upgrade            Rating Downgrade 
 FLEX
 
INFLEX FLEX INFLEX 
Cost of Debt (Kd)  ↓ ↓  ↑ ↑ 
Cost of Equity (Ke)  ↓ □   □  ↑ 
Panel D: Current Paper New Results – Components of Financing Decision Conditional on Financial Flexibility 
 Rating Upgrade            Rating Downgrade 
 FLEX INFLEX FLEX INFLEX 
Net Debt Issuance   ↑ □ □ ↓ 
Net Equity Issuance   □   □   □   □   
 
Fig 1. Summary of our core findings and comparison with key papers. This figure summarizes the findings on the impact of credit 
rating changes, i.e., upgrades vs. downgrades, on the corporate cost of capital and investment and financing decisions. Panel A 
shows the main findings for two key papers in the literature: Kisgen (2009) and Gul et al. (2011), which are independently replicated 
in our study. Panel B shows the new main findings of the current paper in which the analysis is partitioned on the basis of financial 
flexibility status (i.e., firms that are financially flexible vs. firms that are financially inflexible). Panel C (Panel D) shows the new 
main findings of the current paper when decomposed into the underlying components of the cost of capital, i.e., cost of debt vs. cost 
of equity (the forms of financing, i.e., net debt issuance vs. net equity issuance), for financially flexible (FLEX) versus inflexible 
(INFLEX) firms. K denotes the opportunity cost of capital; Kd denotes the cost of debt capital; Ke denotes the cost of equity capital; 
CAPEX denotes capital expenditure by the firm; INDNE denotes issuance of net debt versus net equity, defined as net debt 
issuance: (long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus change in current debt) minus net equity issuance (sale of 
common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock), all scaled by beginning of year total assets; “↓” 
denotes a decline in the variable in question; “↑” denotes an increase in the variable in question; and “□”denotes no change in the 
variable in question. *All results reported in Panel B hold for the subset of firms with investment grade ratings (i.e., ≥ BBB-), as well 
as for firms re-rated to the boundary between investment and speculative grade ratings (i.e., BBB- and BB+), with one exception 
(financially flexible firms upgraded to a non-boundary rating are not found to increase their INDNE). 
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Table 1   
Basic descriptive statistics for financially flexible, inflexible and neutral firms. 
Panel A: Financially flexible firms (N = 5,475) 
Variable      Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Lower Q Median Upper Q Maximum 
Core Experimental variables 
WACC     0.118 0.036 0.046 0.095 0.116 0.135 0.270 
Cost of debt      0.073 0.020 0.038 0.062 0.068 0.084 0.169 
Cost of Equity      0.134 0.040 0.048 0.111 0.130 0.153 0.270 
CAPEX 0.222 0.160 0.004 0.120 0.184 0.271 1.027 
INDNE 0.007 0.109 -0.295    -0.038 -0.001 0.045 0.823 
Control variables 
EBITDA 0.150 0.066 -0.029 0.105 0.147 0.190 0.343 
Tobin’s Q 1.805 0.787 0.805 1.268 1.576 2.091 5.535 
Ln(Assets) 21.961 1.299 17.845 21.059 21.802 22.823 26.417 
NPPE 0.367 0.241 0.015 0.169 0.313 0.556 0.897 
R & D 0.019 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.152 
Dividends 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.025 0.080 
Cash 0.089 0.098 0.001 0.019 0.053 0.124 0.472 
M. Leverage 0.137 0.089 0.001 0.069 0.123 0.193 0.619 
B. Leverage 0.209 0.111 0.002 0.131 0.203 0.281 0.667 
Panel B: Financially inflexible firms (N = 3,780) 
Core experimental variables 
WACC     0.092 0.026 0.046 0.073 0.089 0.107 0.229 
Cost of debt      0.078 0.021 0.038 0.064 0.072 0.089 0.169 
Cost of Equity      0.131 0.040 0.048 0.107 0.127 0.149 0.270 
CAPEX 0.218 0.178 0.004 0.104 0.170 0.268 1.027 
INDNE 0.098 0.204        -0.295    -0.016 0.040 0.148 0.823 
Control variables 
EBITDA 0.120 0.058        -0.029 0.087 0.116 0.148 0.343 
Tobin’s Q 1.330 0.559 0.805 1.020 1.164 1.450 5.535 
Ln(Assets) 21.880 1.432 16.496 20.834 21.764 22.812 27.405 
NPPE 0.382 0.251 0.015 0.166 0.327 0.598 0.897 
R & D 0.011 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.152 
Dividends 0.012 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.017 0.080 
Cash 0.056 0.080 0.001 0.010 0.026 0.064 0.472 
M. Leverage 0.353 0.126 0.046 0.258 0.351 0.436 0.619 
B. Leverage 0.428 0.111 0.130 0.350 0.418 0.500 0.667 
Panel C: Financially neutral firms (N = 3,450) 
Core experimental variables 
WACC     0.106 0.031 0.046 0.084 0.104 0.123 0.260 
Cost of debt      0.073 0.020 0.038 0.062 0.069 0.083 0.168 
Cost of Equity      0.128 0.038 0.048 0.105 0.125 0.144 0.270 
CAPEX 0.218 0.165 0.004 0.114 0.176 0.267 1.027 
INDNE 0.046 0.128        -0.295    -0.017 0.025 0.085 0.823 
Control variables 
EBITDA 0.153 0.067 -0.029 0.109 0.144 0.192 0.343 
Tobin’s Q 1.816 1.013 0.805 1.172 1.442 2.047 5.535 
Ln(Assets) 22.058 1.310 17.948 21.136 21.952 23.004 26.127 
NPPE 0.391 0.238 0.015 0.191 0.340 0.586 0.897 
R & D 0.019 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.152 
Dividends 0.019 0.018 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.028 0.080 
Cash 0.069 0.091 0.001 0.012 0.032 0.088 0.472 
M. Leverage 0.203 0.101 0.001 0.126 0.198 0.282 0.598 
B. Leverage 0.297 0.099 0.002 0.233 0.297 0.361 0.667 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis for the subsamples of financially flexible, 
inflexible and neutral firms, using the market leverage proxy for financial flexibility as defined in Section 3.2.2. The cross-sectional dimension of 
our sample comprises all non-financial firms with credit ratings in the S&P 1500 index, while the time series covers the sample period, 1985 to 
2009. All firms with missing data on the primary dependent variables and negative equity have been excluded. The final sample comprises 12,705 
firm-year observations representing 971 firms (unbalanced panel data). WACC, the overall cost of capital, is calculated as the weighted average cost 
of debt and equity capital. Cost of debt for any year is calculated as the yield-to-maturity on the largest existing bond issue made by the firm in the 
prior year or, where the former is absent, the average yield-to-maturity on largest existing bond issues made by other firms in the prior year with the 
same credit rating. Cost of equity is calculated using the CAPM. CAPEX is defined as capital expenditure for any year scaled by net property, plant 
and equipment at the start of the year. INDNE is issuance of net debt versus net equity defined as: net debt issuance (long-term debt issuance minus 
long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt) minus net equity issuance (sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common 
and preferred stock), all scaled by total assets at the start of the year. EBITDA is calculated as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization, scaled by total assets. Tobin‘s Q is calculated as total liabilities plus market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets. 
Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. NPPE is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment, divided by total assets. Dividend is 
defined as the ratio of total cash dividends to total assets. Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Market leverage is 
defined as the sum of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, all scaled by the market value of total assets. Book leverage is defined as the 
sum of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, all scaled by the book value of total assets. All ratio variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
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Table 2  
Sample distribution of corporate bond credit ratings and re-ratings for financially flexible, inflexible and neutral firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the distribution of corporate bond credit ratings and re-rating activity for the subsamples of financially flexible, inflexible and neutral firms, as well as the overall totals over the 
period 1985-2009 using the market leverage proxy of financial flexibility, as defined in Section 3.2.2. The credit rating used in the analysis is Standard & Poor‘s Long-term Domestic Issuer 
Credit Rating (data item 280), defined by Standard & Poor‘s (2001) as the ―current opinion on an issuer‘s overall capacity to pay its financial obligations‖.  Following Horrigan (1966) and 
Kisgen (2006), credit ratings are transformed into numerical scores, ranging from 1 for the lowest credit ratings (C and D) to 21 for the highest credit rating (AAA).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit Credit Number of firm-years Number upgraded to this grade Number downgraded to this grade Credit Credit 
rating score Flexible Inflexible Neutral Total Flexible Inflexible Neutral Total Flexible Inflexible Neutral Total score rating 
AAA 21 125 28 100 253 6 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 21 AAA 
AA+ 20 56 1 18 75 4 0 0 4 3 1 0 4 20 AA+ 
AA 19 233 54 124 411 13 2 1 16 1 3 8 12 19 AA 
AA- 18 277 72 133 482 14 1 8 23 20 11 15 46 18 AA- 
A+ 17 402 129 273 804 36 7 14 57 23 17 18 58 17 A+ 
A 16 665 272 507 1444 56 12 33 101 27 39 38 104 16 A 
A- 15 542 224 332 1098 62 12 32 106 56 39 40 135 15 A- 
BBB+ 14 601 318 340 1259 78 19 38 135 58 61 41 160 14 BBB+ 
BBB 13 712 465 476 1653 77 26 46 149 52 88 63 203 13 BBB 
BBB- 12 482 389 316 1187 79 26 31 136 50 82 43 175 12 BBB- 
BB+ 11 318 259 216 793 67 30 33 130 38 57 25 120 11 BB+ 
BB 10 383 426 211 1020 94 38 22 154 32 61 29 122 10 BB 
BB- 9 373 514 198 1085 71 32 26 129 36 74 26 136 9 BB- 
B+ 8 216 378 131 725 28 22 11 61 23 73 22 118 8 B+ 
B 7 59 151 48 258 7 8 4 19 15 53 11 79 7 B 
B- 6 25 60 21 106 1 6 1 8 8 30 4 42 6 B- 
CCC+ 5 4 30 6 40 1 0 0 1 1 13 3 17 5 CCC+ 
CCC 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 CCC 
CCC- 3 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 CCC- 
CC 2 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 2 CC 
C&D 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 C&D 
Total 
 
5,475 3,780 3,450 12,705 694 241 301 1,236 445 708 386 1,539  Total 
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Table 3    
Baseline joint regressions of the change in the cost of capital, capital expenditure and issuance of 
net debt versus net equity on credit rating upgrades and downgrades.  
 
  Cost of Capital Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt versus 
Net Equity 
Constant 0.0153 0.2604 0.0280 
   (2.04)**    (9.00)*** (0.87) 
DUP (t-1) -0.0033 0.0179 0.0041 
   -(3.99)***    (5.38)*** (1.08) 
DDOWN (t-1) 0.0039 -0.0178 -0.0140 
    (4.46)***    -(3.98)***    -(3.11)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0198 0.4990 0.3094 
   -(3.58)***     (23.46)***     (12.59)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) 0.0109 -0.0710 0.0501 
 (1.69) -(2.48)** (1.67) 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0006 0.0314 0.0104 
 -(1.47)     (19.54)***     (5.92)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0015 
 -(1.56) -(0.55) -(1.11) 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0041 -0.1850 -0.0040 
    (2.85)***     -(34.56)*** -(0.63) 
R & D (t-1) 0.0139 0.3062 -0.1557 
 (1.27)     (6.91)***    -(2.91)*** 
R & D Dummy (t-1) -0.0003 0.0151 0.0031 
 -(0.37)     (4.35)*** (0.91) 
Dividend (t-1) 0.0146 -1.7455 -0.2790 
 (0.65)      -(17.40)***     -(2.92)*** 
Cash (t-1) -0.0058 0.1357 -0.0177 
 -(1.71)     (10.49)*** -(1.11) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0038 0.0016 
 -(1.88)     -(6.15)***     (2.46)** 
Leverage (t-1)  -0.0749 -0.1086 
      -(8.66)***     -(11.28)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.14                      0.33 0.11 
This table reports the outcome of estimating full-information maximum likelihood regressions. The dependent variables are the (a) 
change in the cost of capital; (b) capital expenditure; and (c) issuance of net debt versus net equity. DUP: is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of unity if a firm‘s credit rating was upgraded in a particular year, and zero otherwise. DDOWN: is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of unity if a firm‘s credit rating was downgraded in a particular year, and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are measured as defined in Table 1. All equations include industry and year dummies. The three equations are estimated 
simultaneously. The regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4    
2SLS regressions of capital expenditure and issuance of net debt versus net equity on the 
estimated cost of capital. 
 Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt  
versus Net Equity 
Constant 0.7143 0.2701 
     (7.92)***    (3.44)*** 
E(Cost of Capital) (t-1)  -3.1568 -1.6879 
     -(5.17)***    -(3.18)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) 0.4798 0.2891 
     (14.58)***     (10.08)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) -0.0716 0.0558 
 -(1.83) (1.64) 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 0.0351 0.0086 
     (10.91)***     (3.07)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) 0.0014 -0.0005 
 (0.94) -(0.37) 
NPPE (t-1) -0.1783 -0.0005 
     -(23.11)*** -(0.07) 
R & D (t-1) 0.4032 -0.0849 
     (6.00)*** -(1.45) 
R & D Dummy (t-1) 0.0098 0.0009 
   (2.41)** (0.26) 
Dividend (t-1) -2.5690 -0.7335 
     -(13.74)***    -(4.50)*** 
Cash (t-1) 0.2109 0.0276 
    (8.26)***  (1.24) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0094 -0.0011 
   -(7.67)*** -(1.06) 
Leverage (t-1)  -0.3363 -0.2552 
    -(7.89)***    -(6.87)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
    0.293    0.144 
This table reports the outcome of estimating two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, as described in the text where changes in 
credit rating, credit rating level and the interaction between the change in credit rating and credit rating are used as instruments to 
estimate cost of capital components as captured by Equations (2) and (3). The dependent variables are capital expenditure and 
issuance of net debt versus net equity. All control variables are defined in Table 1. All equations include industry and year 
dummies. The equation pair is estimated simultaneously in the second stage. The two regressions pertain to our sample of 971 
firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5   
OLS regressions of the change in the cost of capital and its components on the interaction 
between financial flexibility and credit re-rating.  
 ∆ Cost of Debt ∆ Cost of Equity ∆ Cost of Capital 
 M. Leverage B. Leverage M. Leverage B. Leverage M. Leverage B. Leverage 
Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms                                                            
Constant  -0.0232 -0.0229 0.0185 0.0188 0.0130 0.0133 
    -(6.25)***    -(8.94)***   (2.30)**   (2.33)**   (2.09)**   (2.12)** 
DFU (t-1) -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0046 -0.0046 
    -(7.93)***     -(9.71)***   -(2.17)**   -(2.32)**    -(3.81)***     -(3.92)*** 
DFD(t-1) 0.0033 0.0033 0.0017 0.0014 0.0016 0.0015 
     (4.67)***     (5.30)*** (0.87) (0.72) (1.05) (1.03) 
DNA(t-1) -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0015 
 -(1.72)     -(2.18)**    -(2.09)**     -(2.58)*** -(1.51)     -(2.06)** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms 
Constant  -0.0238 -0.0235 0.0181 0.0184 0.0140 0.0143 
    -(6.57)***     -(9.15)***    (5.22)***    (2.28)**    (2.23)**    (2.29)** 
DIU (t-1) -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0010 
     -(3.10)***     -(4.27)*** -(0.52) -(0.61) -(0.48) -(0.50) 
DID (t-1) 0.0057 0.0058 0.0052 0.0049 0.0059 0.0058 
     (9.77)***      (11.74)***    (2.71)***     (3.18)***     (4.79)***    (4.87)*** 
DNA(t-1) -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0025 
 -(0.62) -(0.05) -(1.55) -(1.95)    -(2.51)**    -(3.16)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0152 -0.0151 -0.0092 -0.0089 
 -(0.30) -(0.18)    -(2.68)*** -(1.93) -(1.51) -(1.47) 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) -0.0056 -0.0057 0.0120 0.0118 0.0109 0.0107 
   -(2.01)**    -(2.49)**  (1.51) (1.64) (1.96) (1.92) 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0011 
    -(2.17)** -(1.21) -(1.29) -(0.88)    -(2.45)**   -(2.35)** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
     (2.69)*** (1.08)    -(2.89)*** -(1.35) -(1.62) -(1.70) 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0047 0.0047 0.0041 0.0040 
 -(0.02) -(0.04)    (5.01)***  (2.46)**    (2.74)***    (2.72)*** 
R & D (t-1) 0.0027 0.0023 0.0141 0.0142 0.0169 0.0167 
 (0.85) (0.47) (1.64) (0.91) (1.40) (1.38) 
R & D Dummy (t-1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (1.33) (0.48) (1.02) (0.46) -(0.33) -(0.40) 
Dividend (t-1) 0.0128 0.0118 0.0065 0.0066 0.0111 0.0106 
      (2.81)*** (1.27) (0.39) (0.23) (0.49) (0.47) 
Cash (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0035 -0.0035 
 -(0.26) -(0.17)    -(2.73)***    -(2.03)** -(0.92) -(0.90) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
    -(2.52)** -(1.59) -(1.35) -(0.78) -(1.60) -(1.49) 
Adjusted- R
2
           0.31          0.31            0.11           0.11           0.14       0.14 
This table reports the outcome of estimating, respectively, the change in the cost of debt, the change in the cost of equity and the change in 
the weighted average cost of capital on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating. Two alternative proxies for 
financial flexibility are used: one based on market leverage and the other based on book leverage. Each proxy is a function of the deviation 
of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio following the method employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as 
explained in Section 3.2.2. DFU (DFD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is 
upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially flexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% below its target; and zero otherwise. 
DIU (DID): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if in a given year the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it 
is deemed financially inflexible i.e. the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% above its target; and zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of unity if in any year the firm is deemed financially neutral i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, 
and zero otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the results for upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms 
against the relevant benchmark i.e. stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent 
versions of the system in each case — one version omits the DFS dummy and this is used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second 
version omits the DIS dummy and this is used to benchmark DIU/DID. For each base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction 
dummies, but we report the result for each group to conserve space. All other variables are measured as defined in Table 1. All equations 
include industry and year dummies. The regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate 
that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6   
OLS regressions of capital expenditure and issuance of net debt versus net equity on the 
interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating.  
 Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt versus Net Equity 
 M. Leverage B. Leverage M. Leverage B. Leverage 
Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms                                                            
Constant  0.2843 0.2843 0.0210 0.0211 
    (10.27)***     (10.45)*** (0.75) (0.75) 
DFU (t-1) 0.0226 0.0221 0.0128 0.0118 
    (4.25)***     (4.55)***    (2.37)**    (2.22)** 
DFD(t-1) -0.0100 -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.0108 
 -(1.50) -(1.54) -(1.48) -(1.59) 
DNA(t-1) -0.0116 -0.0125 -0.0088 -0.0080 
    -(3.80)***     -(3.98)***     -(2.83)***    -(2.50)** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms 
Constant  0.2684 0.2673 -0.0048 -0.0048 
    (9.67)***     (9.63)*** -(0.17) -(0.17) 
DIU (t-1) 0.0018 0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0028 
 (0.21) (0.24) -(0.24) -(0.31) 
DID (t-1) -0.0336 -0.0336 -0.0251 -0.0240 
    -(6.14)***     -(6.32)***    -(4.50)***    -(4.42)*** 
DNA(t-1) 0.0042 0.0045 0.0170 0.0179 
 (1.21) (1.26)    (4.76)***    (4.96)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) 0.3549 0.3524 0.2495 0.2472 
     (13.25)***     (13.15)***    (9.14)***    (9.05)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) -0.1832 -0.1824 -0.1393 -0.1371 
     -(7.41)***     -(7.39)***    -(5.53)***    -(5.44)*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 0.0425 0.0418 0.0164 0.0158 
     (21.03)***     (20.68)***    (7.95)***    (7.65)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0025 
   -(2.21)**  -(2.08)**   -(2.15)**    -(2.08)** 
NPPE (t-1) -0.1934 -0.1930 -0.0141 -0.0137 
     -(29.41)***    -(29.37)***   -(2.11)**    -(2.04)** 
R & D (t-1) 0.2903 0.2951 -0.1474 -0.1444 
     (5.42)***    (5.50)***    -(2.70)***    -(2.64)*** 
R & D Dummy (t-1) 0.0146 0.0150 0.0029 0.0032 
     (4.46)***    (4.59)*** (0.88) (0.96) 
Dividend (t-1) -1.6462 -1.6375 -0.2434 -0.2443 
     -(16.39)***    -(16.30)***    -(2.38)**    -(2.38)** 
Cash (t-1) 0.0989 0.0976 -0.0295 -0.0297 
     (5.81)***    (5.74)*** -(1.70) -(1.71) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0028 -0.0029 0.0026 0.0026 
     -(4.60)***    -(4.83)***    (4.32)***    (4.18)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
              0.32              0.32                                          0.10            0.10 
This table reports the outcome of regressing, respectively, the capital expenditure and issuance of net debt versus net equity on the 
interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating. Two alternative proxies for financial flexibility are used: one based on market 
leverage and the other based on book leverage. Each proxy is a function of the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-
run target leverage ratio following the method employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as explained in Section 3.2.2. DFU (DFD): is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed 
financially flexible i.e. the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% below its target; and zero otherwise. DIU (DID): is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially inflexible i.e., 
the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% above its target and zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if in any 
year the firm is deemed financially neutral i.e. the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, and zero otherwise. To enhance 
interpretation, we report the results for upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant benchmark i.e., 
stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent versions of the system in each case — one 
version omits the DFS dummy and this is used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second version omits the DIS dummy and this is used to 
benchmark DIU/DID. For each base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction dummies, but we report the result for each group 
to conserve space. All other variables are measured as defined in Table 1. All equations include industry and year dummies. The 
regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7  
Joint regressions of the change in the cost of capital, capital expenditure and issuance of net debt 
versus net equity on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating.  
 ∆ Cost of Capital Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt  
versus Net Equity 
Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms                                                            
Constant 0.0125 0.2789 0.0186 
 (1.67)    (9.57)*** (0.58) 
DFU (t-1) -0.0046 0.0226 0.0128 
    -(4.47)***    (5.34)***     (2.63)*** 
DFD(t-1) 0.0016 -0.0100 -0.0101 
 (1.14) -(1.35) -(1.14) 
DNA(t-1) -0.0010 -0.0116 -0.0088 
 -(1.49)    -(3.51)***    -(2.73)*** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms 
Constant 0.0139 0.2680 -0.0049 
 (1.87)    (9.10)*** -(0.15) 
DIU (t-1) -0.0010 0.0018 -0.0022 
 -(0.43) (0.21) -(0.24) 
DID (t-1) 0.0059 -0.0337 -0.0251 
    (4.22)***    -(5.00)***    -(3.97)*** 
DNA(t-1) -0.0020 0.0042 0.0170 
  -(2.27)** (1.14)    (4.65)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0092 0.3560 0.2495 
 -(1.67)    (17.15)***    (10.28)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) 0.0110 -0.1836 -0.1393 
    (2.17)**    -(9.30)***    -(5.98)*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0011 0.0425 0.0164 
    -(2.70)***     (25.98)***    (9.69)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0025 
 -(1.44) -(1.85) -(1.86) 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0041 -0.1934 -0.0142 
    (2.72)***    -(32.71)***    -(2.13)** 
R & D (t-1) 0.0170 0.2894 -0.1479 
 (1.55)    (6.53)***    -(2.77)*** 
R & D Dummy (t-1) -0.0002 0.0146 0.0029 
 -(0.31)    (4.15)*** (0.85) 
Dividend (t-1) 0.0110 -1.6478 -0.2437 
 (0.50)    -(16.37)***    -(2.57)** 
Cash (t-1) -0.0034 0.1001 -0.0293 
 -(0.98)    (7.84)*** -(1.85) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0028 0.0026 
 -(1.51)    -(4.65)***    (4.20)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
  0.14   0.32 0.10 
This table reports the outcome of jointly estimating (a) the change in the cost of capital; (b) capital expenditure; and (c) issuance of net debt 
versus net equity on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating based on the market leverage proxy for financial 
flexibility and using the full-information maximum likelihood estimation technique. The flexibility proxy is a function of the deviation of 
each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio, following the method employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as 
explained in Section 3.2.2. DFU (DFD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is 
upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially flexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% below its target; and zero otherwise. 
DIU (DID): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and 
it is deemed financially inflexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% above its target and zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of unity if in any year the firm is deemed financially neutral i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, 
and zero otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the results for upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms 
against the relevant benchmark i.e., stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent 
versions of the system in each case – one version omits the DFS dummy and this is used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second version 
omits the DIS dummy and this is used to benchmark DIU/DID. For each base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction 
dummies, but we report the result for each group to conserve space. All other variables are measured as defined in Table 1. All equations 
include industry and year dummies. The regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate 
that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
41 
 
Table 8    
Joint regressions of the change in the cost of debt and net debt issuance, and the change in the cost of 
equity and net equity issuance on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating. 
 ∆ Cost of Debt Net Debt issuance ∆ Cost of Equity Net Equity issuance 
Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms                                                            
Constant  -0.0233 0.1327 0.0185 0.1112 
    -(6.84)***    (4.50)*** (1.95)    (9.73)*** 
DFU (t-1) -0.0047 0.0141 -0.0034 0.0013 
    -(10.58)***    (3.02)***    -(2.32)** (0.75) 
DFD(t-1) 0.0033 -0.0069 0.0017 0.0032 
     (5.72)*** -(0.80) (0.90) (1.28) 
DNA(t-1) -0.0005 -0.0066 -0.0019 0.0022 
 -(1.49)    -(2.16)**   -(1.99)**    (2.00)** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms 
Constant  -0.0238 0.1112 0.0181 0.1159 
    -(6.99)***    (3.76)*** (1.90)    (10.10)*** 
DIU (t-1) -0.0032 -0.0017 -0.0013 0.0005 
    -(4.87)*** -(0.20) -(0.53) (0.18) 
DID (t-1) 0.0057 -0.0277 0.0052 -0.0026 
    (11.97)***    -(4.54)***     (3.69)*** -(1.02) 
DNA(t-1) 0.0002 0.0145 -0.0014 -0.0025 
 (0.51)     (4.24)*** -(1.34) -(1.83) 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0006 0.0716 -0.0152 -0.1778 
 -(0.23)    (3.08)***    -(2.06)**    -(22.48)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) -0.0056 -0.0701 0.0119 0.0692 
    -(2.77)***    -(3.14)*** (1.80)    (8.82)*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0002 0.0139 -0.0005 -0.0025 
 -(1.14)    (8.21)*** -(0.87)    -(4.50)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) 0.0001 -0.0048 -0.0004 -0.0022 
 (1.10)    -(3.89)*** -(1.27)    -(4.64)*** 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0000 0.0121 0.0047 0.0262 
 (0.02) (1.90)    (2.56)**    (11.34)*** 
R & D (t-1) 0.0026 -0.0441 0.0141 0.1034 
 (0.59) -(0.80) (0.90)    (6.86)*** 
R & D Dummy (t-1) 0.0002 0.0028 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.65) (0.84) (0.50) -(0.07) 
Dividend (t-1) 0.0128 -0.2917 0.0065 -0.0482 
 (1.36)    -(3.32)*** (0.21) -(1.53) 
Cash (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0684 -0.0101 -0.0388 
 -(0.18)    -(4.56)***  -(2.07)**    -(7.70)*** 
Rating (t-1) -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0023 
 -(1.59) (0.51) -(0.77)     -(10.81)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
  0.31  0.06  0.11 0.19 
This table reports the outcome of joint estimation of the change in the nominal cost of debt and net debt issuance, and joint estimation of the 
change in the nominal cost of equity and net equity issuance on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating, based on 
the market leverage proxy of financial flexibility and using the full-information maximum likelihood estimation technique. The flexibility 
proxy is a function of the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio following the method 
employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as explained in Section 3.2.2. DFU (DFD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in 
a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially flexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at 
least 3% below its target; and zero otherwise. DIU (DID): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if in a given year the credit 
rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially inflexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% above its 
target; and zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in any year, the firm is deemed financially neutral 
i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, and zero otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the results for 
upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant benchmark i.e. stable rating financially flexible 
(inflexible) firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent versions of the system in each case — one version omits the DFS dummy 
and this is used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second version omits the DIS dummy and this is used to benchmark DIU/DID. For each 
base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction dummies, but we report the result for each group to conserve space. All other 
variables are measured as defined in Table 1. All equations include industry and year dummies. The regressions pertain to our sample of 
971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9  
Joint regressions of the change in the cost of capital, capital expenditure and issuance of net debt 
versus net equity on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating for 
investment grade firms (ratings ≥ BBB-). 
 ∆ Cost of Capital Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt  
versus Net Equity 
Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms of investment grade                                                            
Constant 0.0094 0.2124 0.0276 
 (1.21)    (7.36)*** (0.82) 
DFU (t-1) -0.0054 0.0199 0.0157 
    -(4.36)***    (4.73)***    (2.68)*** 
DFD(t-1) 0.0027 0.0057 -0.0051 
 (1.72) (0.77) -(0.57) 
DNA(t-1) -0.0023 -0.0081 -0.0076 
    -(3.10)***    -(2.65)***    -(2.27)** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms of investment grade                                                            
Constant 0.0098 0.2029 0.0068 
 (1.43)    (7.50)*** (0.23) 
DIU (t-1) -0.0016 0.0179 0.0218 
 -(0.61) (1.68) (1.84) 
DID (t-1) 0.0038 -0.0166 -0.0216 
    (2.40)**    -(2.66)***    -(3.11)*** 
DNA(t-1) -0.0029 0.0027 0.0068 
    -(3.27)*** (0.76) (0.23) 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0118 0.3900 0.2678 
 -(1.72)    (16.43)***    (9.21)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) 0.0067 -0.2159 -0.0805 
 (1.04)     -(9.29)***    -(2.87)*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0004 0.0375 0.0144 
 -(0.97)    (23.48)***     (7.97)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0024 
 -(1.28) -(0.42) -(1.76) 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0042 -0.1847 -0.0089 
   (2.33)**    -(26.52)*** -(1.08) 
R & D (t-1) 0.0112 0.0941 -0.1278 
 (0.86) (1.90)    -(2.03)** 
R & D Dummy (t-1) -0.0002 0.0078 0.0011 
 -(0.25)    (2.25)** (0.30) 
Dividend (t-1) -0.0217 -1.7848 -0.1930 
 -(0.93)    -(18.26)*** -(1.97) 
Cash (t-1) -0.0015 0.0338 0.0050 
 -(0.34)    (2.33)** (0.24) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0020 
 -(0.61) -(1.00)    (2.37)** 
Adjusted- R
2
   0.10  0.34                                   0.09 
This table reports the outcome of jointly estimating (a) the change in the cost of capital, (b) capital expenditure and (c) issuance of net debt 
versus net equity on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating for the investment grade ratings (≥ BBB) subsample, 
based on the market leverage proxy for financial flexibility and using the full-information maximum likelihood estimation technique. The 
flexibility proxy is a function of the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio, following the 
method employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as explained in Section 3.2.2. DFU (DFD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of 
unity if in a given year the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially flexible i.e. the firm‘s leverage 
ratio is at least 3% below its target; and zero otherwise. DIU (DID): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if in a given year the 
credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially inflexible i.e. the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% above 
its target and zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if in any year the firm is deemed financially neutral 
i.e. the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, and zero otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the results for upgraded 
and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant benchmark i.e. stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) 
firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent versions of the system in each case – one version omits the DFS dummy and this is 
used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second version omits the DIS dummy and this is used to benchmark DIU/DID. For each base, the 
regression includes all the remaining interaction dummies, but we report the result for each group to conserve space. All other variables are 
measured as defined in Table 1. All equations include industry and year dummies. The regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 
12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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Table 10  
Joint regressions of the change in the cost of capital, capital expenditure and issuance of net debt versus net 
equity on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating distinguishing firms re-rated to the 
boundary of investment/speculative grade (BBB- and BB+). 
 ∆ Cost of Capital Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt 
versus Net Equity 
 Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms  
   Constant 0.0142 0.2799 0.0182 
 
(1.90)    (9.58)*** (0.56) 
 DFNBU (t-1) -0.0039 0.0198 0.0039 
 
    -(3.37)***    (4.18)*** (0.68) 
 DFNBD (t-1) 0.0015 -0.0103 -0.0084 
 
(0.96) -(1.24) -(0.88) 
 DFBU(t-1) -0.0075 0.0340 0.0491 
 
   -(4.17)***     (4.41)***    (6.00)*** 
 DFBD(t-1) 0.0018 -0.0089 -0.0175 
 
(0.62) -(0.56) -(0.74) 
 DNA(t-1) -0.0011 -0.0116 -0.0088 
 
-(1.52)    -(3.52)***    -(2.73)*** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms  
 Constant 0.0139 0.2677 -0.0044 
 
(1.86)    (9.06)*** -(0.14) 
DINBU (t-1) -0.0010 0.0098 -0.0014 
 
-(0.41) (1.03) -(0.14) 
DINBD(t-1) 0.0058 -0.0310 -0.0224 
 
   (3.75)***    -(4.09)***     -(3.25)*** 
DIBU(t-1) -0.0008 -0.0213 -0.0044 
 
-(0.16) -(1.23) -(0.19) 
DIBD(t-1) 0.0064 -0.0437 -0.0354 
 
   (2.36)**    -(3.31)***     -(2.60)*** 
DNA(t-1) -0.0020 0.0042 0.0169 
 
   -(2.26)** (1.13)     (4.63)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0091 0.3551 0.2488 
 
-(1.65)    (17.05)***     (10.24)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) 0.0109 -0.1827 -0.1387 
 
   (2.15)**    -(9.21)***    -(5.95)*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0011 0.0424 0.0162 
 
   -(2.66)***    (25.92)***    (9.59)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0025 
 
-(1.56) -(1.85) -(1.85) 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0039 -0.1932 -0.0135 
 
   (2.60)***    -(32.50)***    -(2.03)** 
R & D (t-1) 0.0167 0.2905 -0.1455 
 
(1.52)    (6.55)***    -(2.73)*** 
R & D Dummy (t-1) -0.0003 0.0148 0.0031 
 
-(0.39)    (4.17)*** (0.90) 
Dividend (t-1) 0.0108 -1.6448 -0.2373 
 
(0.49)    -(16.33)***    -(2.50)** 
Cash (t-1) -0.0037 0.0990 -0.0292 
 
-(1.05)    (7.73)*** -(1.85) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0027 0.0027 
 
-(1.62)    -(4.60)***     (4.27)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.14  0.32  0.10 
This table reports the outcome of jointly estimating (a) the change in the cost of capital; (b) capital expenditure; and (c) issuance of net debt versus net 
equity on the interaction between financial flexibility and credit re-rating to the investment/speculative grade boundary and non-boundary re-ratings. 
This analysis is based on the market leverage proxy for financial flexibility and uses the full-information maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
The flexibility proxy is a function of the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio, following the method 
employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as explained in Section 3.2.2. A firm is deemed financially flexible (inflexible) if the firm‘s leverage ratio is 
at least 3% below (above) its target. DFNBU
 
(DFNBD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if in a given year the credit rating of the 
firm is upgraded (downgraded) to any rating other than BBB- or BB+ and the firm is deemed to be financially flexible; and zero otherwise. DFBU 
(DFBD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) to either BBB- or 
BB+ and the firm is deemed to be financially flexible; and zero otherwise. DINBU
 
(DINBD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a 
given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) to any rating other than BBB- or BB+ and the firm is deemed to be financially 
inflexible; and zero otherwise. DIBU (DIBD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is 
upgraded (downgraded) to either BBB- or BB+ and the firm is deemed to be financially inflexible; and zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of unity if, in any year, the firm is deemed financially neutral i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, and zero 
otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the results for upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant 
benchmark i.e., stable financially flexible (inflexible) firms. For each base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction dummies, but we 
report the result for each group to conserve space. All other variables are measured as defined in Table 1. All equations include industry and year 
dummies. The three equations are estimated simultaneously. The regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. 
***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11  
Robustness Check — 2SLS regressions of the change in the cost of capital, capital expenditure 
and issuance of net debt versus net equity on the estimated interaction between financial 
flexibility and credit re-rating.  
 ∆ Cost of Capital Capital Expenditure Issuance of Net Debt  
versus Net Equity 
 Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms                                                            
Constant 0.0112 0.2939 0.0316 
 (1.79)    (10.62)*** (1.12) 
DFU* (t-1) -0.0046 0.0398 0.0217 
    -(3.10)***     (6.11)***    (3.27)*** 
DFD*(t-1) 0.0002 -0.0092 -0.0144 
 (0.11) -(1.14) -(1.75) 
DNA*(t-1) -0.0010 -0.0109 -0.0086 
 -(1.43)    -(3.63)***     -(2.83)*** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms 
Constant 0.0127 0.2760 0.0059 
    (2.02)**    (9.93)*** (0.21) 
DIU*(t-1) 0.0021 0.0174 -0.0005 
 (0.75) (1.41) -(0.04) 
DID* (t-1) 0.0048 -0.0376 -0.0458 
    (2.99)***    -(5.28)***    -(6.32)*** 
DNA*(t-1) -0.0025 0.0070 0.0171 
    -(3.22)***   (2.06)**    (4.97)*** 
EBITDA (t-1) -0.0109 0.3647 0.2601 
 -(1.81)    (13.61)***    (9.53)*** 
∆.EBITDA (t-1) 0.0144 -0.2174 -0.1685 
    (2.54)**    -(8.67)***    -(6.59)*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) -0.0012 0.0421 0.0161 
    -(2.61)***    (20.82)***    (7.79)*** 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0031 
 -(1.21)    -(2.86)***    -(2.69)*** 
NPPE (t-1) 0.0044 -0.1957 -0.0153 
     (2.99)***    -(29.78)***    -(2.29)** 
R & D (t-1) 0.0180 0.2897 -0.1398 
 (1.48)    (5.40)***    -(2.56)** 
R & D Dummy (t-
1) 
-0.0002 0.0144 0.0031 
 -(0.31)    (4.39)*** (0.93) 
Dividend (t-1) 0.0204 -1.6766 -0.2565 
 (0.90)    -(16.77)***    -(2.52)** 
Cash (t-1) -0.0035 0.0987 -0.0278 
 -(0.90)    (5.80)*** -(1.60) 
Rating (t-1) -0.0003 -0.0022 0.0029 
 -(2.02)**    -(3.71)***    (4.73)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.13 0.32 0.10 
This table reports the outcome of estimating two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, as described in the text. The dependent variables are (a) the 
change in the cost of capital; (b) capital expenditure; and (c) issuance of net debt versus net equity. The estimated interaction variables between 
credit rating and financial flexibility are created based on the interaction between the deviation of the firm‘s actual market leverage ratio from the 
predicted firm market leverage estimated in Equation (1) and the predicted credit ratings estimated in Equation (4). The flexibility proxy is a function 
of the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio, following the method employed by Denis and McKeon 
(2012), as explained in Section 3.2.2. A firm is deemed financially flexible (inflexible) if the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% below (above) its 
target. DFU* (DFD*): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded), 
based on 2SLS predicted ratings, and the firm is deemed to be financially flexible; and zero otherwise. DIU* (DID*): is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded), based on 2SLS predicted ratings, and the firm is 
deemed to be financially inflexible; and zero otherwise. DNA*: is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in any year, the firm is deemed 
financially neutral i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, and zero otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the results for 
upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant benchmark i.e., stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) 
firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent versions of the system in each case — one version omits the DFS* dummy and this is used to 
benchmark DFU
*
/DFD
*
, while the second version omits the DIS
*
 dummy, and this is used to benchmark DIU
*
/DID
*
. For each base, the regression 
includes all the remaining interaction dummies, but we report the result for each group to conserve space. All other variables are measured as defined 
in Table 1. All equations include industry and year dummies. The three equations are estimated simultaneously. The regressions pertain to our 
sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12  
Further robustness tests - OLS and joint regressions with alternative cost of debt proxies.   
Panel A: Robustness of OLS estimation of ∆ Cost of Debt Equation reported in Table 5 
 
Panel B: Robustness of Joint estimation of WACC, CAPEX and INDNE equations reported in Table 7 
  
YTM: Yield-to-maturity  
(Table 5) 
YS-RB: Yield spread on 
recent bond issue 
YS-LB: Yield spread on 
largest bond issue 
∆ Cost of Capital  
(WACC) 
Capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) 
Issuance of net debt versus net 
equity (INDNE) 
  
Market 
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
YTM YS-RB YS-LB YTM YS-RB YS-LB YTM    YS-RB      YS-LB 
Base = stable rating, financially flexible firms 
Constant  -0.0232 -0.0229 0.0010 0.0011 0.0001 0.0002 0.0125 0.0342 0.0342 0.2789 0.2843 0.2841 0.0186 0.0210 0.0205 
     -(6.25)***    -(8.94)*** (0.57) (0.66) (0.03) (0.11) (1.67)   (4.59)***    (4.60)***    (9.57)***    (9.76)***    (9.76)*** (0.58) (0.65) (0.64) 
DFU (t-1) -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0041 0.0226 0.0226 0.0227 0.0128 0.0128 0.0129 
 
   -(7.93)***     -(9.71)***    -(11.69)***    -(11.77)*** -(12.80)*** -(12.83)***    -(4.47)***   -(4.00)***    -(3.97)***    (5.34)***    (5.35)***    (5.36)***     (2.63)***    (2.64)***   (2.65)*** 
DFD(t-1) 0.0033 0.0033 0.0035 0.0034 0.0033 0.0032 0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0101 
 
    (4.67)***     (5.30)***    (8.71)***    (8.33)*** (9.08)*** (8.66)*** (1.14) (1.22) (1.20) -(1.35) -(1.35) -(1.35) -(1.14) -(1.14)       -(1.14) 
DNA(t-1) -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0088 
  -(1.72)     -(2.18)** -(0.76) -(0.84) -(0.40) -(0.59) -(1.49) -(1.60) -(1.58)    -(3.51)***    -(3.52)***    -(3.51)***    -(2.73)***    -(2.72)***   -(2.72)*** 
Base = stable rating, financially inflexible firms 
Constant  -0.0238 -0.0235 0.0008 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0139 0.0359 0.0346 0.2680 0.2709 0.2693 -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0048 
 
   -(6.57)***     -(9.15)*** (0.47) (0.60) -(0.21) -(0.09) (1.87)    (4.82)***    (4.65)***    (9.10)***    (9.20)***    (9.14)*** -(0.15) -(0.14) -(0.15) 
DIU (t-1) -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 
 
    -(3.10)***     -(4.27)***   -(6.01)***    -(6.51)*** -(6.03)*** -(6.24)*** -(0.43) -(0.51) -(0.42) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) -(0.24) -(0.24) -(0.24) 
DID (t-1) 0.0057 0.0058 0.0047 0.0046 0.0045 0.0043 0.0059 0.0039 0.0039 -0.0337 -0.0336 -0.0337 -0.0251 -0.0252 -0.0251 
 
    (9.77)***      (11.74)***     (13.95)***     (14.16)*** (14.99)*** (14.75)***    (4.22)***    (2.76)***    (2.76)***    -(5.00)***   -(5.00)***   -(5.00)***    -(3.97)***    -(3.98)***   -(3.97)*** 
DNA(t-1) -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0017 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0170 0.0170 0.0170 
  -(0.62) -(0.05) (0.12) -(0.26) (1.52) (1.05)  -(2.27)**  -(2.04)** -(1.93)** (1.14) (1.13) (1.14)    (4.65)***    (4.65)***   (4.65)*** 
Adjusted- R
2
        0.31           0.31        0.48          0.48        0.48        0.48     0.14     0.38    0.38 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.10 0.10 0.10 
This table assesses the robustness of the OLS regressions of the cost of debt equation (Table 5) and the joint regressions of the WACC, CAPEX and INDNE equations (Table 7), using alternative proxies for the cost of debt. Two alternative cost of 
debt proxies are used: one based on the yield spread on recent bond issue made in the former year (YS-RB) and the other is based on yield spread on largest bond issue made in the former year (YS-LB). For comparative purposes, we repeat the 
counterpart results from Tables 5 and 7, based on the yield-to-maturity proxy (YTM). Matching the format of the earlier tables, Panel A (B) reports two (one) alternative proxies (proxy) for financial flexibility based on: market leverage and book 
leverage (market leverage). Specifically, each proxy is a function of the deviation of each firm‘s annual leverage ratio from its long-run target leverage ratio following the method employed by Denis and McKeon (2012) as explained in Section 3.2.2. 
DFU (DFD): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially flexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% below its target; and zero 
otherwise. DIU (DID): is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in a given year, the credit rating of the firm is upgraded (downgraded) and it is deemed financially inflexible i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is at least 3% above its target; and 
zero otherwise. DNA: is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity if, in any year, the firm is deemed financially neutral i.e., the firm‘s leverage ratio is within ± 3% from its target, and zero otherwise. To enhance interpretation, we report the 
results for upgraded and downgraded financially flexible (inflexible) firms against the relevant benchmark i.e., stable rating financially flexible (inflexible) firms. We achieve this by estimating two equivalent versions of the system in each case — 
one version omits the DFS dummy and this is used to benchmark DFU/DFD, while the second version omits the DIS dummy and this is used to benchmark DIU/DID. For each base, the regression includes all the remaining interaction dummies, but 
we report the result for each group to conserve space. Each regression also includes all the same control variables as before (measured as defined in Table 1), in addition to year and industry dummies, but these results are not reported to conserve 
space. The regressions pertain to our sample of 971 firms and 12,705 firm-year observations. ***, **, indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Highlights:  
 
An Investigation of the Asymmetric link between Credit Re-ratings and Corporate 
Financial Decisions: “Flicking the Switch” with Financial Flexibility 
 
 
 flexibility mediates the influence of credit ratings asymmetrically 
 flexibility ―flicks the switch‖ exclusively for rating upgrades  
 inflexibility ―flicks the switch‖ exclusively for rating downgrades 
 combining inflexibility with upgrades leaves financial decision making unaffected 
 combining flexibility with downgrades leaves financial decision making unaffected 
